Edited Volumes
Cartesian Epistemology, special issue of Synthese 195 (11), 2018
co-edited with Jean-Baptiste Rauzy and Stefano Cossara
Journal Articles and Book Chapters
9. Perceiving God like an angel, Religious Studies, forthcoming, PDF link (co-authored with Wen Chen)
Mystical experiences are often regarded as potential sources of epistemic justification for religious beliefs. However, the ‘disanalogy objection’ maintains that, in contrast to sense perceptions, mystical experiences lack social verifiability and are thus merely subjective states that cannot substantiate objective truths. This article explores a novel externalist response that involves the concept of angels. As spiritual beings, angels can directly perceive God and verify these perceptions in their celestial community. Thus, the ‘direct perception of God’ is not inherently incapable of social verification. While invoking angels might appear contentious, it coheres with the externalist approach of conceptualising cognitive states under hypothetical settings. Despite the differences between humans and angels and their lack of interaction for verification purposes, our approach remains valid because mystics not only exemplify the same general type of ‘direct perception of God’ as angels but can also be preliminary members of a wider celestial community.
8. Explanationism and the awareness of logical truths, Asian Journal of Philosophy 3 (55), 2024 link
In Appearance and Explanation, McCain and Moretti propose a novel internalist account of epistemic justification called phenomenal explanationism, which combines phenomenal conservatism and explanationism. I argue that the current version of phenomenal explanationism faces a dilemma: either it omits the awareness requirement but implies an implausible form of logical-mathematical omniscience, or it preserves the requirement but leads to a vicious regress. I suggest how phenomenal explanationism might be revised to avoid this dilemma.
7. The verifiability of Daoist somatic mystical experience, Ergo, forthcoming, PDF (co-authored with Wen Chen)
Mystical religious experiences typically purport to engage with the transcendent and often claim to involve encounters with spiritual entities or a detachment from the material world. Daoism diverges from this paradigm. This paper examines Daoist mystical experiences of bodily transformations and explores their epistemological implications. Specifically, we defend the justificatory power of Daoist somatic experiences against the disanalogy objection. The disanalogy objection posits that mystical experiences, in contrast to sense perceptions, are not socially verifiable and thereby lacks prima facie epistemic value. We argue that some Daoist mystical bodily states, being essentially spatiotemporal, are exempt from this challenge. This leads to a broader understanding of mysticism and offers a partial resolution to the disanalogy objection.
6. Practical knowledge without practical expertise: the social cognitive extension via outsourcing, Philosophical Studies 180(4): 1255-75, 2023
PDF link
According to a prominent assumption, know-how entails practical expertise, e.g., knowing how to swim requires being reliably able to swim or grasping the practical sense of a method of swimming. I argue that instead of expertise, one can know how to fulfil a task via other people's expertise. For instance, a patient can know how to cure a disease by consulting a doctor, and a traveller can know how to reach a place by asking a local guide. Thus, know-how can be outsourced. I argue that outsourcing is a new way for knowledge to be social, and it reveals a novel pattern of cognitive extension that does not rely on EMT or HEC.
5. Gradable know-how, Inquiry, forthcoming PDF link
Against Pavese 2017, I improve the gradability argument against intellectualist accounts of know-how by referring to an agent's default level of reliability at achieving the purported practical tasks.
4. The gradation puzzle of intellectual assurance, Analysis 81 (3): 488-96, 2021 PDF link
I argue that the notion of intellectual assurance faces a gradation puzzle, and I refute Fumerton's recent proposal that the gradation of intellectual assurance is essentially a matter of semantic vagueness.
3. Closure, deduction and hinge commitments, Synthese 198 (15): 3533-51, 2021 PDF link
I argue against Duncan Pritchard's anti-skeptical approach as presented in his Epistemic Angst. The criticism generalizes against other forms of anti-skeptical Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology.
2. The paradox of the diffusiveness of power, Synthese 194 (7): 2489-2500, 2017 link
The topic of basic act is controversial, but theorists of agency normally agree that complex performances are based on comparatively simple ones. To the extent that we can attribute powers to agents over various tasks, it is also plausible to suppose that our powers over complex tasks are based on powers over the simple. Chisholm's principle of the diffusiveness of power, which formulated this idea, is unfortunately incompatible with the assumption that we can sometimes do otherwise.
1. Phenomenal concepts and the speckled hen, Analysis 76 (4): 422-426, 2016 link
A variation of the speckled hen problem is proposed to counter Feldman's "phenomenal concepts" approach to the classical version of the problem.
Publications in Chinese
9. 笛卡尔的清楚明晰——认知内容还是认知方式，《世界哲学》，2024 PDF
8. 确定性与梯度——富莫尔顿亲历理论的困境，《哲学研究》，2022 PDF
7. 笛卡尔身心可分离性论证中的上帝，《哲学动态》，2021 PDF
6. 《恋爱中的苏格拉底——哲学入门十讲》，清华大学出版社，2020
5. 我思与怀疑的语境，《哲学研究》，2018 PDF
4. 笛卡尔，清楚明晰与意志自由，《法国哲学研究》，2018 PDF
3. 清楚明晰与可错主义，《法兰西思想评论》，2015
2. 时间与本源：德里达对海德格尔时间观念的批判，《世界哲学》，2012 (1) PDF
1. 对死亡作为死亡的经验：关于《论精神》中动物难题的注释，《世界哲学》，2009 (3) PDF
Book Reviews
Epistemic Contextualism: A Defense, by Baumann, Peter, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 96 (2): 398-401, 2018
Cartesian Epistemology, special issue of Synthese 195 (11), 2018
co-edited with Jean-Baptiste Rauzy and Stefano Cossara
Journal Articles and Book Chapters
9. Perceiving God like an angel, Religious Studies, forthcoming, PDF link (co-authored with Wen Chen)
Mystical experiences are often regarded as potential sources of epistemic justification for religious beliefs. However, the ‘disanalogy objection’ maintains that, in contrast to sense perceptions, mystical experiences lack social verifiability and are thus merely subjective states that cannot substantiate objective truths. This article explores a novel externalist response that involves the concept of angels. As spiritual beings, angels can directly perceive God and verify these perceptions in their celestial community. Thus, the ‘direct perception of God’ is not inherently incapable of social verification. While invoking angels might appear contentious, it coheres with the externalist approach of conceptualising cognitive states under hypothetical settings. Despite the differences between humans and angels and their lack of interaction for verification purposes, our approach remains valid because mystics not only exemplify the same general type of ‘direct perception of God’ as angels but can also be preliminary members of a wider celestial community.
8. Explanationism and the awareness of logical truths, Asian Journal of Philosophy 3 (55), 2024 link
In Appearance and Explanation, McCain and Moretti propose a novel internalist account of epistemic justification called phenomenal explanationism, which combines phenomenal conservatism and explanationism. I argue that the current version of phenomenal explanationism faces a dilemma: either it omits the awareness requirement but implies an implausible form of logical-mathematical omniscience, or it preserves the requirement but leads to a vicious regress. I suggest how phenomenal explanationism might be revised to avoid this dilemma.
7. The verifiability of Daoist somatic mystical experience, Ergo, forthcoming, PDF (co-authored with Wen Chen)
Mystical religious experiences typically purport to engage with the transcendent and often claim to involve encounters with spiritual entities or a detachment from the material world. Daoism diverges from this paradigm. This paper examines Daoist mystical experiences of bodily transformations and explores their epistemological implications. Specifically, we defend the justificatory power of Daoist somatic experiences against the disanalogy objection. The disanalogy objection posits that mystical experiences, in contrast to sense perceptions, are not socially verifiable and thereby lacks prima facie epistemic value. We argue that some Daoist mystical bodily states, being essentially spatiotemporal, are exempt from this challenge. This leads to a broader understanding of mysticism and offers a partial resolution to the disanalogy objection.
6. Practical knowledge without practical expertise: the social cognitive extension via outsourcing, Philosophical Studies 180(4): 1255-75, 2023
PDF link
According to a prominent assumption, know-how entails practical expertise, e.g., knowing how to swim requires being reliably able to swim or grasping the practical sense of a method of swimming. I argue that instead of expertise, one can know how to fulfil a task via other people's expertise. For instance, a patient can know how to cure a disease by consulting a doctor, and a traveller can know how to reach a place by asking a local guide. Thus, know-how can be outsourced. I argue that outsourcing is a new way for knowledge to be social, and it reveals a novel pattern of cognitive extension that does not rely on EMT or HEC.
5. Gradable know-how, Inquiry, forthcoming PDF link
Against Pavese 2017, I improve the gradability argument against intellectualist accounts of know-how by referring to an agent's default level of reliability at achieving the purported practical tasks.
4. The gradation puzzle of intellectual assurance, Analysis 81 (3): 488-96, 2021 PDF link
I argue that the notion of intellectual assurance faces a gradation puzzle, and I refute Fumerton's recent proposal that the gradation of intellectual assurance is essentially a matter of semantic vagueness.
3. Closure, deduction and hinge commitments, Synthese 198 (15): 3533-51, 2021 PDF link
I argue against Duncan Pritchard's anti-skeptical approach as presented in his Epistemic Angst. The criticism generalizes against other forms of anti-skeptical Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology.
2. The paradox of the diffusiveness of power, Synthese 194 (7): 2489-2500, 2017 link
The topic of basic act is controversial, but theorists of agency normally agree that complex performances are based on comparatively simple ones. To the extent that we can attribute powers to agents over various tasks, it is also plausible to suppose that our powers over complex tasks are based on powers over the simple. Chisholm's principle of the diffusiveness of power, which formulated this idea, is unfortunately incompatible with the assumption that we can sometimes do otherwise.
1. Phenomenal concepts and the speckled hen, Analysis 76 (4): 422-426, 2016 link
A variation of the speckled hen problem is proposed to counter Feldman's "phenomenal concepts" approach to the classical version of the problem.
Publications in Chinese
9. 笛卡尔的清楚明晰——认知内容还是认知方式，《世界哲学》，2024 PDF
8. 确定性与梯度——富莫尔顿亲历理论的困境，《哲学研究》，2022 PDF
7. 笛卡尔身心可分离性论证中的上帝，《哲学动态》，2021 PDF
6. 《恋爱中的苏格拉底——哲学入门十讲》，清华大学出版社，2020
5. 我思与怀疑的语境，《哲学研究》，2018 PDF
4. 笛卡尔，清楚明晰与意志自由，《法国哲学研究》，2018 PDF
3. 清楚明晰与可错主义，《法兰西思想评论》，2015
2. 时间与本源：德里达对海德格尔时间观念的批判，《世界哲学》，2012 (1) PDF
1. 对死亡作为死亡的经验：关于《论精神》中动物难题的注释，《世界哲学》，2009 (3) PDF
Book Reviews
Epistemic Contextualism: A Defense, by Baumann, Peter, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 96 (2): 398-401, 2018
